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1 Introduction 
A firm can only obtain the returns to the investment of training a worker if he or 
she stays with the firm. The risk of loosing the worker discourages the provision 
of training. This is why sustaining a continuous employment relationship is an 
incentive to the provision of training and vice versa. The firm itself has the 
possibility of improving labour stability by offering specific training to their 
employees and by the promise of boosting their professional career. 
As we can show in the next section, there are few studies about the re-
lationship between training and employment mobility. We understand that 
mobility implies moving jobs or going from employment to non-employment 
(either unemployment or out of the labour force). This study refers only to 
the relation between the receipt of training in a period and the probability of 
non-employment in the next period. This issue has special interest in Spain, 
a country with high unemployment, high incidence of temporary jobs and low 
private expenditure in training activities1 . 
The data used in this paper belong to the first cycle for Spain of the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP), refering to 1994. This database contains 
information about the receipt of training as well as the type of training received. 
Moreover, it offers retrospective information about workers' situation in the 
labour market in two different moments of time. Thus, the data permit to 
analyse the link between firm-provided training and the exit from employment. 
The main problem that arises in this investigation is that there are unob-
served variables associated with individuals' jobs which may affect both the 
probability of receiving training and the probability of staying in employment. 
1 In the second quarter of 1999, the unemployment rate in Spain was 15.6%, whereas the 
unemployment rate in the EU was 10.2%. On the other hand, the Spanish "Labour Force 
Survey" reports that the percentage of employees aged 30 and over in training during 1996 
was 2.1% in Spain, whereas EU average was 5.6%. 
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Another problem is the bidirectional causality between the two variables: train-
ing is supposed to reduce future mobility and previous stability is supposed to 
induce firm-provided training. In order to use the appropriate methodology, 
we present a recursive model in which training and employment stability are 
both determined. The main result of this exercise is that firm-provided training 
reduces the probability of exit from employment. This result is only significant 
for the total sample and for females. When training is considered an exogenous 
variable in the mobility equation its coefficient is not significant. 
In the next section we present a summary of the main theoretical and em-
pirical studies dealing with the issue of training and employment stability. In 
section 3, we discuss the econometric methodology. We describe the data sam-
ple in section 4. vVe provide the estimation results in section 5, and in section 
6 we conclude. 
2 Review of the literature 
2.1 Theoretical models of training and job turnover 
The classical theory of human capital, as formulated by Becker (1962, 1964), 
recognised that an individual's human capital is affected by more than the level 
of education achieved. Ability and on-the-job training also play a part. In his 
book, Human Capital, Becker distinguishes between general on-the-job training, 
which increases an individual's productivity in any firm; and specific training, 
which increases an individual's productivity only at the firm in which he is 
employed. However, Becker suggests that most of the training provided by 
firms is a combination of both, general and specific training. 
He argues that the cost of specific training has to be shared by the worker 
and the firm. The employee might be paid a wage greater than marginal prod-
uct during the training period. After the training, the employee's wage is below 
marginal product, although above what the employee could get elsewhere since 
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the training only increases productivity in the current job. For general training, 
Becker argues that the employees alone should pay for training costs by accept-
ing lower wages while receiving training. Workers accept lower wages because 
they expect that, as a result of the training, the present value of the stream of 
lifetime benefits net of this costs will be higher than if they had not undertaken 
the training. This view also predicts, such as the Ben-Porath model (1967), 
that investment in general training declines with age, because of the shorter 
investment horizon. In the human capital model, there is no inefficiency in 
the provision of general training unless firms share some of the costs of general 
training. 
However, human capital models predict that the temporal horizon for work-
ers obtaining returns from the training investment depends on the type of train-
ing, general or specific. In the case of general training, the investment horizon is 
the expected remaining time in work. On the other hand, when the training is 
specific the horizon restricts to the expected remaining time in the current job, 
since the returns to such investments can only be realised by both the individ-
ual and their employer while they keep their current employment relation. This 
suggests that there should be a negative relationship between the reception of 
training and the probability of leaving employment. 2. 
There are also some recent studies (Katz and Ziderman (1990), Stevens 
(1994), Acemoglu and Pischke (1998), Chang and Wang (1996), Tugores (1998)) 
that remark, differing from the classical theory of human capital, the existence 
of a poaching externality leading to under-provision of firm training. These 
models predict, as well as the human capital model, a negative effect of training 
on future labour turnover. 
Acemoglu and Pishke (1998) have developed a model which shows that work-
ers may not pay for the general training they receive. In their model, the cru-
2In this case, we refer to both, general and specific training. The employer will obtain 
returns of their investment during the time the trained worker stays in the firm. 
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cial assumption is that an individual's current employer has better information 
about the worker's ability than other firms. This informational advantage gives 
the firm some ex post monopsony power over the worker that encourages the 
firm to provide general training. The model can lead to multiple equilibria. In 
one equilibrium, quits are high and therefore the employers are more reluctant to 
bear the cost of any general training. In the other equilibrium, there is low quits 
and high training. One interesting feature of this model is that the equilibrium 
with high quits, which involves a better match of individuals to jobs, may be 
less efficient because the level of training is too low. Acemoglu and Pishke look 
at the implications of their model for individuals undertaking apprenticeship in 
Germany. They use two cross-sections of the German "Qualification and Career 
Survey" conducted in 1979 and 1985-86. 
Theoretical studies make it clear that the link between turnover and training 
has a number of important features and that different theoretical approaches 
may well generate different predictions. For example, the life-cycle human cap-
ital model generates the prediction that firm-specific training should reduce the 
probability of an individual leaving his or her current job. When one moves away 
from the perfect competition notion inherent in this model, predictions become 
more difficult. Most of the alternative models also predict that firm-specific 
training should reduce future mobility, but these models also argue that there 
may be a poaching externality leading to under-investment in general training. 
On the other hand, according to the human capital model, there should be no 
employer-funded general training. 
From the theoretical point of view, the relation between previous job mobility 
and training is more ambiguous. On one hand, there is likely to be a positive 
relation as employers who wish to develop their skill base will want to provide 
training for newer recruits. On the other hand, if one views recent or frequent 
job mobility as a signal of problems with previous job matches, this may result 
in a negative association between on-the-job training and previous job mobility. 
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Training and turnover are, then, two issues mutually related that have mo-
tivated, theoretical work and few empirical studies. These we examine in the 
next subsection. 
2.2 Empirical studies of training and employment stabil-
ity 
There have been relative few empirical studies looking at the relationship be-
tween training and employment stability. The studies have considered either 
the effect of training on employment or the effect of employment stability on 
training, and refer basically to Great Britain, USA, and Germany. Next, we 
discuss some of the studies and their not always coincident conclusions. 
Greenhalgh and Stewart (1987) study the determinants and effects of on-
the-job and off-the-job training. They use data from the "National Training 
Survey", including information about training practices of more than 50.000 
women and men in Britain. Their study distinguishes between men, married 
and not married women. Using a logit model, they examine the probability of 
being trained and the effect that the receipt of training has on the occupational 
mobility. Results show that women have a smaller probability of receiving train-
ing than men. Moreover, the returns of recent training are greater for women, 
married or not, than for men. The authors interpret it as a possible inefficiency 
distribution of training resources between men and women. 
Lynch (1991) examines the factors that contribute to explain the quit rate 
of individuals that work in their first job. As explanatory variables, she includes 
the receipt of on-the-job training and off-the-job training; and uses data from 
the USA "National Longitudinal Survey of Youth" . Distinguishing between men 
and women, she concludes that no type of training has a significant effect on 
the probability of leaving the job in the male sample. However, women have a 
lower probability of leaving the firm if they have received on-the-job training. 
The effects turn to be the contrary in the case of off-the-job training. 
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Lillard and Tan (1992) use data on reported training in several cross-sectional 
and panel surveys to answer several questions: Who receives training?, how 
much and why?, and how does training affect future earnings and employment 
stability? The effects of training on unemployment are investigated using a 
probit model. The study includes three measures of training: training in the 
current period, accumulated training events, and duration since training. Re-
sults show that training is associated with a subsequent decline in the likelihood 
of unemployment. Of all the sources of training, company training is most en-
during. 
Tan et al. (1992) compare the postchool training experiences of young men 
in the United States, Britain and Australia. They analyse, among other things, 
the determinants of training as well as the exogenous impact of training on 
employment stability. Their probit results suggest that training reduces the 
likelihood of unemployment in all three countries. 
Campbell III (1993) estimates quit equations to test the efficiency wage hy-
pothesis using USA data from the "Employment Opportunity Pilot Proyect 
Survey". In all his specifications, training has a negative impact on the prob-
ability of quitting a job. This result confirms the idea of a correct efficiency 
wage theory: training, as a good indicator of productivity, increases wages and, 
therefore, mobility costs, reducing the quits rate. 
Mincer (1993) uses information of the "Panel Study of Income Dynamics" 
in order to analyse the effect of training on mobility, that is, on the length of 
tenure in the firm in which training was received and on the frequency of job 
change over longer periods of time. Moreover, it looks at the effects of training 
on wages over time. Results estimate negative effects of job training on turnover 
and positive effects on wage growth in the firm over longer periods. 
A British study is that of Booth and Satchell (1994), who use data from the 
"National Child Development Survey" of 1981 to look at the impact of appren-
ticeships on tenure. Their sample is formed of individuals who left school at the 
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age of 16 and entered the labour market. They found that men who completed 
apprenticeship had a lower exit rate from jobs than men who undertook no 
training, whereas men who terminated their apprenticeship before completion 
had a higher exit rate. 
Elias (1994) focuses on a regional subsample of British adults using panel 
data from the "Social Change and Economic Life Initiative" of 1986-90. He uses 
these data to look at whether or not job-related training received in the job held 
in the preceding month of employment influences the probability of leaving a 
job. He uses a logit model that allows for unobserved individual heterogeneity 
and controls for factors such as job tenure, trade union membership, and other 
individual and job-related characteristics. He finds that such training reduced 
the probability of turnover for women but was not an important determinant 
of men's job mobility. 
Winkelmann (1994) looks at the effect of education and training on labour 
mobility in West Germany. He uses data from the "German Socio-Economic 
Panel" over the period 1974 to 1990. In looking at the determinants of labour 
mobility, he uses a Poisson regression model, and for occupational mobility 
he uses a probit model. He finds that apprenticeships and all other types of 
vocational training reduce labour mobility. General schooling, on the other 
hand, has no effect on labour mobility. He argues that this supports the idea 
that the negative effect of training on mobility is mainly due to firm specificness. 
His results for occupational mobility are less clear. 
Greenhalgh and Mavrotas (1996) use data from the 1984 and 1989 "British 
Labour Force Surveys" to look at the determinants of job mobility and training. 
They find that job mobility is highest for the young and for those individuals 
with higher educational qualifications. They use a recursive model to look at 
the determinants of mobility during the past year and then the impact this has 
on the probability of receiving training in the last four weeks. They find that 
mobility has no significant effect on training incidence for men. For women, 
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recent job movers are more likely to be trained than others. They also find that 
public sector workers have high training rates and low mobility. Sectoral R&D 
activity is only associated with more training for men. 
Royalty (1996) looks at the effect of predicted probability of job-to-job 
turnover and job-to-nonemployment turnover on the probability of undertak-
ing general and specific training. She uses data from the 1980-86 US "National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth" for both men and women. She finds that a higher 
estimated probability of job-to-nonemployment turnover reduces the probabil-
ity of receiving company training for men and women and off-the-job training 
for men. A higher estimated probability of job-to-job turnover has no effect on 
company training and increases the likelihood of undertaking off-the-job train-
ing for women. Interestingly, she finds that the significant gender difference in 
the probability of undertaking both types of training is strongly reduced once 
controls for the predicted probability of job turnover are included. 
Dearden et al. (1997) examine the link between training and job mobility 
in Britain, drawing on two large-scale microeconomic data sources, the "Na-
tional Child Development Survey" and the "Quarterly Labour Force Survey". 
They find that mobility is lower for individuals who received training in pre-
vious periods, specially when training involved a qualification being obtained. 
Looking at the relationship between training and previous mobility, they find 
that, for men, there is no clear evidence that training receipt is lower or higher 
for recent movers. For women, there is some evidence of a positive link. This 
study remarks that different effects emerge for different forms of training, being 
specially important the distinction between employer-funded and non-employer-
funded training. 
To summarise, the studies dealing with the relationship between training 
and mobility have focused mainly on the British, USA, and German economies. 
Their results can be summarise in the following way: 
• There is a negative effect of previous training on employment mobility. 
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This result is often small or insignificant for the male sample . 
• There are insignificant effects of employment mobility on training for men, 
with some evidence of positive, but statistically weak, effects for women. 
In the Spanish case, the relation between training and employment mobility 
has not been treated for the moment. There are also few works analysing the 
determinants and consequences of the investment in training activities. This 
scarcity of studies is partially justified by the difficulties in obtaining adequate 
data. For example, Alba (1994) studies the determinants of training and their 
effect on productivity at firm level using data from the "Encuesta de Negociaci6n 
Colectiva en las Grandes Empresas". This database contains information about 
the economic characteristics and industrial practices of about 600 firms. The 
data indicate that in 1988, 60% of the big firms trained some of their workers, 
while 15.9% of the workers received training. 
In work in progress, Alba and Tugores (1999) study the factors that deter-
mine training in Spain using data from the "Labour Force Survey" (Encuesta 
de Poblaci6n Activa), from 1987 to 1998. Results reveal that the incidence of 
training in Spain is relatively small. Only 0.30% of the employees has been 
trained in the firm in the 4 weeks that precede the interview. This percentage 
raises up to 2.62% in case of receiving courses off the firm. 
Moreover, Abellan et al. (1997) describe the main characteristics of the 
Spanish system of collective bargaining, and analyse its influence on the labour 
market and firm-provided training. The authors conclude that sectoral bar-
gaining creates a negative incentive for firms to train its workers. Their sample 
belongs to the "Encuesta de Estructura, Conciencia, y Biograffa de Clase" and 
they use a logit model to estimate the probability of receiving training control-
ing for factors such as gender, age, education, experience and type of union 
negotiation. As regards the determinants of training, results are consistent with 
those obtained here. Moreover, we attempt to contribute to the research on the 
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relation between training and employment stability where there is no evidence 
for Spain. 
3 Methodology 
How do we model the relationship between transitions out of employment and 
firm-provided training? The ECHP allows us to track individuals' labour mar-
ket stata over time, so we can measure directly the effects of training received 
in one period on labour market status in a subsequent period. It is also possible 
to analyse the relationship between past labour force transitions and the prob-
ability of receiving training. However, the nature of the observed data makes it 
easier to focus on the first relationship: the effect of training on future labour 
market transitions. 
Modelling the relationship between mobility and training is not straight-
forward. Using longitudinal data gives the possibility of adopting an explicit 
"before and after approach". This involves a crucial question: "if an individual 
receives training in time period t, do they change their labour status in t + I?". 
To answer this question, we analyse the assumptions underlying different alter-
native models. 
It seems reasonable to think that there are unobserved variables which may 
affect both the probability of receiving training and the probability of keeping 
an employment. Training and employment are the outcome of structural deter-
minants on both demand and supply sides, which cannot be analysed separately 
with individual cross-section data. The equations which follow, therefore, must 
be regarded as a reduced-form relationship reflecting the respective matching of 
the demand and supply of training and employment. 
For example, from the employers' side, we can think that the employer de-
cides simultaneously the provision of training and whether to keep or layoff a 
worker in the near future. So, when the employer decides to train a worker in 
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period t, he is implicitly deciding to try to maintain the employment relation 
in period t + 1. This is consistent with the fact that the employer who provides 
training obviously desires to reap the benefits of their investment. 
The problem can be stated by the following two latent equations conditional 
on a set of exogenous variables: 
TRAINING? b1X1 i + V; (3.1) 
EMPLOYMENTt a1X2i + a2TRAININGi + Ui (3.2) 
where T RAI N I N G* is the net utility or the profit obtained by the employer 
when training a worker, EMPLOYMENT* is the net utility or the profit 
when keeping (not laying off) the worker. On the other hand, Xl and X2 are 
the vectors of exogenous variables that condition each equation; and a y bare 
the interest parameters. We assume for simplicity of notation that the error 
terms V; and Ui have symmetric distributions. 
However, data permit to observe choices instead of utilities. We know if an 
individual has been trained or not, and if he remains employed or not. The 
relation between observed and latent variables is given by: 
TRAINING i 
TRAINING i 
EMPLOYMENTi 
EMPLOYMENTi 
1 if TRAINING? > 0 
o otherwise 
1 if EMPLOYMENTt > 0 
o otherwise 
Of course, because TRAINING* and EMPLOYMENT* are observed as 
dichotomous variables, we need to impose the conditions Var(V;) = 1 and 
Var(Ui ) = 1. 
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So, latent variables measure intentions whereas observed variables measure 
actions. The model presented above implies that the intention of keeping or 
not the employee depends on the action of being trained or not. It seems clear 
that TRAINING i precedes EMPLOYMENTt, but is not a precondition, it 
is possible to change the labour situation with or without being trained. So, we 
shall refer to this model as a recursive model, not a sequential model. 
3.1 Identifying conditions 
The conditions for logical consistency in models with mixtures of latent vari-
ables and their partially observed realizations can be checked by considering 
the corresponding reduced forms, or by considering the sum of the different 
probabilities. 
In this model the conditions for identification are that Vi and Ui be inde-
pendent, or that there is at least one variable in Xli not included in X2 i .3 
3.2 Estimation of the model 
For the estimation of the model, we can use the maximum likelihood method. 
Different assumptions imply the use of different methodology in estimating it. 
If Vi and Ui are independent, then one can estimate both equations sepa-
rately, each one as a probit model. However, given the special nature of our 
data, it seems reasonable to think that there exists interdependency between 
the unobserved latent variables, which causes the not independence of the error 
terms4 . If Vi and Ui are not independent, the estimation of both equations 
separately does not give consistent estimates of the parameters for the second 
equation (3.2). The use of the two-stage method, in which we first obtain the 
3The identifying and estimation conditions of different recursive models are exposed in 
Maddala (1983). 
4The papers of Booth (1991) and Green (1993) remark the necessity of treating the receipt 
of training as an endogenous variable in the study of their effects on wages and labour turnover. 
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probit estimates of (3.1) and then substitute this prediction in (3.2) as a regres-
sor, is not an adequate estimation method in the recursive model used here. 
For the maximum likelihood estimation of our model, we proceed as follows: 
Denote the joint distribution function of (Vi, Ui) by F(.,.) and assume that it is a 
bivariate normal distribution. This yield the well known bivariate probit model. 
Then, the joint probability distribution of T RAJ N J NG and EM PLOY M ENT 
is given by the following expressions: 
Pll = Prob(TRAINING = 1, EMPLOYMENT = 1) = 
F[(b1X1 i , a1 + a2X2i), p] 
PlO = Prob(TRAINING = 1, EMPLOYMENT = 0) = 
F[(b1X1 i , -a1 - a2X2i ), p] 
P01 = Prob(TRAINING = 0, EMPLOYMENT = 1) = 
F[( -b1X1i, a2X2;), -p] 
POO = Prob(TRAINING = 0, EMPLOYMENT = 0) = 
F[( -b1X1i, -a2X2i ), -p] 
And the likelihood function to be maximized is: 
L(b1,a1,a2) IT Pl1TRAINING EMPLOYMENT 
*P10TRAINING(1-EMPLOYMENT) 
*P01 (l-TRAINING)EMPLOYMENT 
*POO(1-TRAI N I NG)(l-EM PLOY M ENT) 
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The use of the maximum likelihood method involves evaluation of double 
integrals. However, it assures obtaining consistent estimations5 . 
4 Data description 
This research uses data from the European Community Households Panel (ECHP) 
for Spain. We use information of the first cycle in 1994 and some retrospective 
questions regarding 1993. 
The main training question is asked to the workers as follows: "During 1993, 
did you receive some education or training courses, including part time and short 
courses?". In case of a positive answer the worker is asked: "Did your employer 
payor organise the course?". vVhen the two questions are positively answered we 
consider that the worker has received firm-provided training. We also consider 
the case in which the worker has received off-the-job training when the employeee 
received a non ordinary course that was neither paid nor organised by their 
employer. Moreover, the questionnaire offers complementary information about 
the type, duration, aim and utility of the courses. 
The sample used is restricted to individuals who have been employed at least 
during one month in 1993. We are left with a final data set of 5.970 individuals, 
of which approximately one third are women. 
Table 1 reports the training incidence by gender. As it is shown, 9.05% of 
the sample (540 individuals) received firm-provided training during 1993. This 
percentage is slightly greater for women (9.71%) than for men (8.69%)6. The 
proportion of people receiving non ordinary courses out of the firm is 7.92%, 
with a greater difference between women (11.14%) and men (6.19%). 
Table 2 shows that the probability of being trained increases with the level 
of education. This result is true in the case of both, within-the-firm and off-the-
5For more detailed econometric analysis see Maddala and Lee (1976). 
6In the same year, 1993, 4.55% of the employees in Spain where receiving training subsidies 
in their firms throughout FORCEM. 
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firm training. People with three years of higher education (diplomatura) have 
the greatest probability of being trained in the firm, 24.12%, whereas 18.10% 
people with four or more years of university studies (licenciatura) received train-
ing. This percentaje falls to 1.85% in the case of non-qualified individuals. In 
the case of off-the-firm training, the workers with a higher training incidence 
were the ones with vocational education (Formaci6n ProfesionaD, 14.20%. This 
percentage is also obtained for people with university studies. 
The relationship between training and age is shown in Table 3. It shows 
that people aged 26 to 45 years have been trained in the firm in a higher pro-
portion than both the youngest and the oldest groups of workers. The highest 
proportion, 13.82%, corresponds to people between 36 and 45 years old. This 
pattern is different for off-the-firm training, which incidence decreases with age. 
The proportion of young workers between 16 and 25 years old who follow the 
latter type of studies is 12.71% compared to (32% of people older than 55 7. 
To complement this data description we shall take into account the informa-
tion provided by the 1994 ECHP for Spain about the inherent characteristics of 
the courses received in and off the firm. This data set offers information about 
the type of studies, the intensity and duration of the courses, as well as the goal 
and utility associated with this investment in human capital. 
Table 4 shows that most of the training received by employees is given as 
part-time courses. Part-time courses are 75% of firm-provided courses; and 
about 72% of off-the-firm training courses. The rest of training is, usually, 
given in the form of full-time courses. Other type of courses (most of which are 
by mail courses) are really infrequent when provided by the firm and reaches 
the 8.66% of the courses provided out of the firm. 
Total duration of courses appears in Table 5. Of firm-provided training 
courses, 37.04% have duration of less than two weeks. The rest of them are 
equally distributed between more than three months and less than three months. 
7Note that we are always refering to employees. 
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There is not a clear pattern in the courses offered out of the firm: 75.90% of 
them are taken during less than 3 months. Then, we can conclude that, m 
general, courses provided by the employer are shorter than the others. 
Table 6 refers to the main aim of the training. Of the employees receiving 
training in their firms, 97.78% assure that the courses have the goal of improving 
their qualifications and professional outlook. This percentage is slightly small, 
92.60%, when referring to other courses. 
When the workers have answered in the afirmative that the main objective 
of the courses is to improve their qualifications and professional outlook, they 
are asked about the extent to which such objectives are achieved. Table 7 
shows that most of the workers think that the training courses are the way to 
reach their goals. The 87% of the employees indicate that training has been 
really usefull or quite useful. This percentage falls to 82% when referring to 
off-the-firm training. There are few studies that find a positive relation between 
the receipt of training and an increase in workers' productivity and salaries8 . 
According to Table 7, workers' perception of the utility of the training received 
is quite positive. 
To finish \vith the data description, we present the employment transitions 
from 1993 to 1994. We have to keep in mind that the sample includes 5.970 
persons who worked as employees at least for one month during 1993. These 
individuals can be working, unemployed or inactive in 1994. The main objec-
tive at this point is to study labour transitions according to whether training 
was provided and the type of training received. Table 8 shows that 80.17% 
of individuals working at least for one month during 1993 remain in work in 
19949 , 10.94% are unemployed and 8.89% left the labour force. These num-
bers substantially change when considering only people trained in 1993. The 
percentage of workers receiving firm-provided training during 1993 and being 
8For the Spanish case, see Alba (1994). 
9 As indicated earlier, the ECHP does not allow us to distinguish the job-to-job movements. 
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in work during 1994 grows to 92.96%, and the transition to unemployment and 
to inactivity is to 4.63% and 2.41% respectively. Then, our data show a nega-
tive relation between the reception of on-the-job training and the probability of 
leaving employment. 
The contrary seems to occur when studying the relation between the recep-
tion of off-the-firm training and transitions from employment to unemployment 
or inactivity. The percentage of people receiving these courses and remaining 
in work in 1994 falls to the 71.25% compared with the 79.6% of the individuals 
not trained during 1993. These different patterns point out the convenience to 
differentiate these two types of training. 
Tables 9 and 10 show the results for men and women. There not seem to 
exist important differences by gender when training is provided within the firm. 
However, men are more likely to remain in work in case they have been trained 
out of the firm or in case they have not received any training. 
5 Econometric analysis 
In this section we analyse the relationship between firm-provided training and 
exit from employment. As we explained in section 3, it seems reasonable that 
the employer that provides training to an employee decides, at the same time, 
to retain him in the firm. That is, the labour situation in period t + 1 depends 
on the training decision in period t; and the probability of receiving training in 
t depends on the employer's disposition to retain the worker. The problem, as 
stated through the equations (3.1) and (3.2), can be expressed as follows: 
TRAINING;' 
EMPLOYMENTt 
b1X1i + Vi 
a1X2i + a2TRAININGi + Ui 
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This recursive model requires different estimation methods depending on the 
assumptions about the error terms, V; and Ui . 
If there is independence between the error terms, that is, if there is not un-
observable elements affecting the training and the mobility decision, the model 
can be estimated separately using a pro bit model for each equation. Results are 
presented in subsection 5.1 for this case. 
However, as we have previosly discussed, it seems reasonable to consider the 
existence of certain dependence between training and mobility in the model, 
causing a correlation between the error terms. In this case, a correct estima-
tion of the model requires the use of a particular maximum likelihood method. 
Section 3 contains the detailed expression of the maximum likelihood function. 
The results obtained through this methodology are presented in subsection 5.2. 
At this point, it is important to remark that we are going to estimate the 
relation between training and remaining in employment. In the employment 
equation, the dependent variable is equal to one if the worker remains employed. 
With the data used in this article, it is not possible to distinguish the job-to-job 
movements. "Ve study the effect of firm-provided training on the probability of 
remaining in employment10 . The key point we stress is that it is the employer 
who decides whether or not to layoff a worker, and this decision depends on 
having invested in that workers' human capital or not. So that, the proposed 
model is the one that better fits the data available for this paper, that is, a 
bivariate probit model. 
Before presenting and interpreting the main results, we define the explana-
tory variables that are included in each equation. 
Explanatory variables included in the training equation 
1. Dummy variables regarding the workers' personal characteristics: sex (it 
10 Notice that the workers who may have left the firm voluntarely are very likely to show up 
employed somewhere else. 
18 
takes value equal to one for women); marital status (with value equal to 
one if the worker is married); age (grouped in different categories); and 
maximum level of studies completed (primary, secondary or university 
education). 
2. Variables related to the workers' labour history: a group of dummy vari-
ables reflecting the number of times the worker has been unemployed in 
the five years that precede the interview (none, one, two, three or more). 
3. Geographic variables: referred to the region of residence: south, east, 
centre, Madrid, and north of Spain. 
Explanatory variables included in the employment equation 
1. Training variables: "training93" (firm-provided training) is a dummy vari-
able that takes the value equal to one when the individual has received a 
course paid or organised by the employer. On the other hand, "course93" 
(off-the-firm training) is a dummy that takes the value equal to one if 
the worker has received other non regulated courses. Both are the crucial 
variables in the study of the effect that the receip of training has in the 
probability of remaining in employment. 
2. Variables related to personal characteristics: the same as in the training 
equation, that is, sex, marital status, age, and education. 
3. Variables related to labour status during 1993: a group of dummies re-
ferring to the proportion of the year 1993 that the individual has been 
employed (all 1993, from 9 to 11 months, from 6 to 8 months, from 3 to 5 
months, or less than 3 months). 
4. Other geographic variables: the same as in the training equation. 
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5.1 The case of independent errors 
In Table 11 results of the probit model estimation on training determinants 
are presented. This specification is correct under the assumption of indepen-
dent distribution of the error terms. The model has been estimated for the total 
sample, as well as for men and women separately. Results show that there is not 
a significant difference by gender in the probability of receiving training. Differ-
entiating by marital status, married men result to have a greatest probability of 
receiving training in their firms than single men, whereas the marital status ap-
pears to be insignificant in the women sample. In the total sample, individuals 
of less than 36 years and more than 55 years have a smaller probability of been 
trained compared with adults between 36 and 45 years old. Differentiating by 
gender, it appears that the oldest men are the ones with less probability of being 
trained, whereas the group of women with the smaller probability corresponds 
to the youngest. 
It can be shown that having secondary or university studies increases sub-
stantially the probability of being trained at work. This result remains the 
same for the subsamples of men and women separately. Regional or geograph-
ical variables point out that there are not important differences in the Spanish 
territory on the receipt of training. However, the dummies that measure the 
labour stability of the worker's history (the number oftimes the worker has been 
unemployed in the past 5 years) appears to be very significant. People with no 
unemployment in their recent history show higher probability of receiving train-
ing. \Vomen who suffered unemployment once in the preceding five years are 
not less likely to receive training than women who never were employed during 
that time. 
Table 12 presents the results of the probit model that studies the determi-
nants of remaining employed one year after the provision of training, under the 
assumption of independently distributed errors. The effect that the receipt of 
firm-provided training has on the probability of being employed in 1994 is in-
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significant. Once we control for the effect of education, age, stability, and other 
demographic variables, the receipt of training has no effect on the probability 
of being in employment the following period. We will later see that this result 
changes when considering the possibility of correlation between the error terms. 
On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that the receipt of off-the-firm train-
ing in 1993 has a significant and negative effect on the probability of remaining 
employed in 1994. 
Other results worth mentioning are that the probability of remaining em-
ployed is higher for men, married men, higher educated, and middle age people. 
Geographically, people leaving in the south of Spain have the highest probability 
of going to unemployment or inactivity. The impact that having been in work 
during the complete year 1993 has in the probability of being in work in 1994 
is strongly positive and significant. The greater the unemployment incidence 
during 1993 the highest the probability of being unemployed or inactive in 1994. 
Finally, in the next subsection we study the relation between firm-provided 
training and posterior mobility through a recursive model. This specification 
admits the possibility of dependence in the error terms caused by the existence 
of unobservable heterogeneity. We think that this is a more reasonable specifi-
cation. 
5.2 The case of dependent errors 
Table 13 presents the results corresponding to the recursive model of training 
provision in one period and employment in the following period. Admiting the 
existence of correlation between the error terms of the two equations, we have 
estimated the model presented in section 3. In fact, the results presented in 
the previous subsection are a particular case of this general model when the 
correlation between the error terms is imposed to be zero. Table 13 shows the 
values of these correlations. We present the results for the total sample, 5.970 
employees working at least one month during 1993, as well as for men and 
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women separately. 
TRAINING EQUATION RESULTS 
In general, results coincide with the ones obtained in the estimation of the 
probit model on determiIlant~ of training. Men and women do not present 
significant differences in the probability of receiving training. On one hand, 
being middle age, highly educated, and married (only for men) appears to be 
associated with a higher probability of receiving training in the firm. On the 
other hand, a labour history of high unemployment incidence decreases this 
probability. 
EMPLOYMENT EQUATION RESULTS 
As expected, the results for the effect of firm-provided training on mobility 
are quite different from those obtained assuming independence of error terms. 
'Vhen we consider the receipt of training in 1993 as an endogenous variable in 
the mobility equation, its effect on the probability of retaining employment is 
positive and significant for the total and the female samples. This results im-
plies that receiving training improves the employment prospects of the workers. 
However, this result does not hold for the male samplell . 
Again, receiving off-the-firm training has a negative and significant effect on 
future employment. Workers who receive this type of training have a smaller 
probability of being in work the following year than not trained and firm-trained 
workers. These results emphasize the differences between training within the 
firm and off the firm highlighted in the descriptive as well as in the econometric 
analysis. The rest of the explanatory variables included in the regression do not 
11 We have worked with other specifications, for example, excluding the labour history vari-
ables during 1993. This alternative specification presents a higher positive and significant 
effect of training on employment, so,it reinforces the indicated finding. Results are available 
on request. 
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present great differences with respect to the results contained in Table 12. 
Identification of the coefficient estimates of the employment equation IS 
achieved by the inclusion of the group of dummies reflecting the number of 
times the worker has been unemployed in the preceding 5 years in the training 
equation and their absence from the employment equation 12. 
ESTIMATION OF THE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE ERROR TERMS 
The estimator for the errors correlation appears to be negative and signif-
icantly different from zero in the total and the female samples. This result 
seems to confirm the need to modelize the relation between training and mobil-
ity through a recursive model in order to obtain consistent estimations for the 
parameters. As the correlation coeficients are close to zero in the male sample, 
the estimations from the simultaneous model are very similar to those obtained 
using a simple probit model. Recall that in the male sample receiving training 
in a certain year does not affect in a significant way the probability of being in 
employment the following year. 
The negative sign of the estimated correlation coefficient between the errors 
would be consistent with the idea that, in the total and the female sample, the 
unobservables affecting both equations show a dichotomy between the reception 
of training and the keeping of an employment. 
6 Conclusions 
In Becker's theory of human capital, firms prefer to invest in specific train-
ing instead of general training because the latter type of investment offers less 
guaranties of return. In recent studies, where market imperfections (imperfect 
12We have tried the inclusion of other variables like the amount of government subsidies 
devoted to training activities in each region. We do not include them because they do not 
appear to affect significantly the results. 
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competition or asymmetric information) are introduced, the distinction between 
general and specific training appears less important in explaining the employers 
attitude toward bearing the training costs. However, the mobility of workers 
is the key point to understand the resources allocation to training: investing 
in training reduces future labour mobility and, in turn, labour stability favours 
the investment in training. Empirical studies does not have concluding results. 
Some find a negative but sometimes insignificant relation between training and 
mobility, and also insignificant results are found in the study of the effect that 
previous mobility has on the investment in training. 
The aim of this paper has been to investigate the relationship between train-
ing and transitions out of employment, using data from the first wave of the 
ECHP. A first look at the data confirms that the training incidence in Spain 
is substantially smaller than in other countries; only 9% of Spanish employees 
have participated in courses paid or organised by the employer. The main char-
acteristics associated with a higher probability of receiving training are: middle 
age, high qualification, and previous labour stability. The typical person in the 
reception of off-the-job training is a young woman with secondary education. 
In general, courses received in the firm are of less duration and intensity than 
courses received off the firm. The main objective of all types of training is to 
improve the worker's qualification and professional prospects. 
In analysing the relation between labour and mobility, we have used a two 
equations model -a training equation and a employment equation- that allows 
for the possibility of correlation between the error terms. The likelihood function 
is constructed by the assumption of a normal bivariate distribution of the error 
terms. 
When exogenous, in the employment equation does not change the result 
that being a woman and having participated in off-the-firm training courses 
reduce the probability of being in work the following year does not depend on 
whether the variable receipt of training is taken as endogenous or exogenous. 
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Moreover, to be a middle-aged person, to have higher education and to have 
been in work during all 1993, affects positively the probability of remaining in 
employment. However, the effect that the training variable has on the proba-
bility of being in work in the following period differs according to the type of 
model estimated. If we consider the receipt of training as an exogenous variable 
and estimate the model by two separated probits, the effect that the training 
variable has on the employment equation appears to be insignificant. However, 
if we estimate the recursive model considering the training variable as endoge-
nous, it has a positive and significant effect on the probability of being in work 
the following year. However, this effect is not significant for the male sample. 
These findings are quite consistent with those obtained for other countries. 
However, we have not tackle the question of why firm-provided training increases 
the probability of remaining in employment among women but not among men. 
In future research, it will be worth investigating the possible differences between 
men and women in this respect. 
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Table 1. Type of courses received 
Man Woman Total 
Firm-provided 337 203 540 
8.69 9.71 9.05 
Off-the-firm 240 233 473 
6.19 11.14 7.92 
No courses 3302 1655 4957 
85.13 79.15 83.03 
Total 3879 2091 5970 
100.00 100.00 100.00 
Table 2. The level of education and the type of courses received 
Firm-provided Off-the-firm No courses Total 
No studies 40 52 2065 2157 
1.85 2.41 95.73 100.00 
Primary 89 117 1294 1500 
5.93 7.80 86.27 100.00 
Secondary 116 86 585 787 
14.74 10.93 74.33 100.00 
Vocational 77 69 345 491 
15.68 14.05 70.26 100.00 
University(lst level) 123 71 316 510 
24.12 13.92 61.96 100.00 
University(2nd level) 95 78 352 525 
18.10 14.86 67.05 100.00 
Total 540 473 4957 5970 
9.05 7.92 83.03 100.00 
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Table 3. Age and the type of courses received 
Firm-provided Off-the-firm No courses Total 
16-25 years 45 148 971 1164 
3.87 12.71 83.42 100.00 
26-35 years 171 192 1434 1797 
9.52 10.68 79.80 100.00 
36-45 years 209 93 1210 1510 
13.82 6.15 80.03 100.00 
46-55 years 93 33 839 965 
9.64 3.42 86.94 100.00 
56 years or more 22 7 503 532 
4.14 1.32 94.55 100.00 
Total 540 473 4957 5970 
9.05 7.92 83.03 100.00 
Table 4. Intensity of courses 
Firm-provided Off-the-firm 
Full-time 128 88 
23.70 18.60 
Part-time 407 344 
75.37 72.73 
Others 5 41 
0.93 8.66 
Total 540 473 
100.00 100.00 
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Table 5. Duration of courses 
Firm-provided Off-the-firm 
Less than 2 weeks 200 36 
37.04 7.61 
From 2 to 9 weeks 163 72 
30.19 15.22 
More than 9 weeks 171 359 
31.67 75.90 
No answer 6 6 
1.11 1.27 
Total 540 473 
100.00 100.00 
Table 6. Do the courses improve qualifications and professional outlook? 
Firm-provided Off-the-firm 
Yes 528 438 
97.78 92.69 
No 12 31 
2.22 6.55 
No answer 0 4 
0.00 0.85 
Total 540 473 
100.00 100.00 
28 
Table 7. Usefulness of the courses 
Firm-provided Off-the-firm 
Very useful 201 149 
38.07 33.71 
Quite useful 260 214 
49.24 48.42 
Barely useful 54 61 
10.23 13.80 
Not useful 6 12 
1.14 2.71 
No answer 7 6 
1.33 1.36 
Total 528 442 
100.00 100.00 
Table 8. Workers' labour market situation at interview date in 1994 (total 
sample) 
Firm-provided Off-the-firm No courses Total 
Employed 502 337 3947 4786 
92.96 71.25 79.62 80.17 
Unemployed 25 74 554 653 
4.63 15.64 11.18 10.94 
Inactive 13 62 456 531 
2.41 13.11 9.2 8.89 
Total 540 473 4957 5970 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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Table 9. Workers' labour market situation at interview date in 1994 (men) 
Firm-provided Off-the-firm No courses Total 
Employed 314 187 2714 3215 
93.18 77.92 82.19 82.88 
Unemployed 15 27 350 392 
4.45 11.25 10.60 10.11 
Inactive 8 26 238 272 
2.37 10.83 7.21 7.01 
Total 337 240 3302 3879 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Table 10. 'Workers' labour market situation at interview date in 1994 (women) 
Firm-provided Off-the-firm No courses Total 
Employed 188 150 1233 1571 
92.61 64.38 74.50 75.13 
Unemployed 10 47 204 261 
4.93 20.17 12.33 12.48 
Inactive 5 36 218 259 
2.46 15.45 13.17 12.39 
Total 203 233 1655 2091 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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Table 11. Probit model on the determinants of firm-provided training 
Total Men Women 
Training93 Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t 
Woman -0.0134 -0.253 
Married 0.1292 2.054 0.2269 2.536 0.05565 0.598 
16-25 years -0.3765 -3.852 -0.1690 -1.320 -0.6814 -4.210 
26-35 years -0.2030 -3.187 -0.1312 -1.612 -0.3234 -3.090 
46-55 years -0.1059 -1.431 -0.0725 -0.822 -0.1799 -1.285 
56 or more -0.4873 -4.296 -0.5224 -3.884 -0.3751 -1.749 
Second. 0.7587 12.242 0.6835 9.274 1.0049 8.418 
Univ. 0.9106 14.541 0.7686 9.532 1.1943 10.940 
East -0.0103 -0.149 -0.0071 -0.082 -0.0009 -0.008 
Centre -0.1221 -1.331 -0.0938 -0.839 -0.2114 -1.299 
Madrid -0.0650 -0.757 0.0008 0.008 -0.1875 -1.253 
North -0.0799 -1.045 -0.0520 -0.557 -0.1269 -0.942 
Uneml -0.2017 -2.712 -0.2452 -2.460 -0.1071 -0.931 
Unem2 -0.3438 -3.037 -0.2781 -2.054 -0.4563 -2.176 
Unem3 -0.5755 -5.213 -0.5452 -3.946 -0.6162 -3.305 
Constant -1.546 -16.216 -1.6311 -13.030 -1.601 -10.492 
N.observ. 5970 3879 2091 
Adj. R2 0.1325 0.1117 0.1835 
Chi 2 480.38 255.86 244.53 
% cases 9.05% 8.69% 9.71% 
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Table 12. Pro bit model on the determinants of maintaining employment 
Total Men Women 
Employ94 Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t 
Training93 0.0480 00486 0.0022 0.018 0.0672 00407 
Course93 -0.2166 -2.7l6 -0.0825 -0.7l3 -0.3620 -3.143 
Woman -0.2815 -6.129 
Married 0.1513 2.830 0.3849 5.231 -0.0696 -0.846 
16-25 years -0.3258 -4.292 -0.1860 -1.811 -0.4337 -3.703 
26-35 years -0.1509 -2.410 -0.0607 -0.694 -0.2381 -2.282 
46-55 years -0.0047 -0.059 -0.01l2 -0.1l3 0.0121 0.087 
56 or more -0.6877 -8.334 -0.7643 -7.7l4 -0.5012 -3.217 
Second. 0.1427 2.411 0.1839 2.401 0.0931 0.970 
Univ. 0.5356 6.930 004143 3.813 0.6893 6.114 
East 0.1586 2.701 0.1378 1.811 0.2262 2.397 
Centre 0.1483 2.031 0.1255 1.394 0.1862 1.457 
Madrid 0.1245 1.496 0.0553 0.524 0.2762 2.002 
North 0.0654 0.987 0.1311 1.557 -0.057l -0.516 
Emp100 1.6127 33.410 1.5049 24.343 1.7668 22.361 
Emp75 1.1294 7.966 1.2239 6.561 0.9592 4.151 
Empu50 0.9653 7.093 0.9580 5.143 1.0022 4.915 
Emp25 0.6488 5.003 0.6441 3.759 0.6095 3.029 
Constant -0.1547 -1.783 -0.2865 -2.563 -0.3773 -2.839 
N.observ. 5970 3879 2091 
Adj. R2 0.3031 0.2799 0.3442 
Chi 2 1.802.67 994.15 807.32 
% cases 80.17% 82.88% 75.13% 
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Table 13. Training and employment in a recursive model 
Total Men Women 
Training Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t 
Woman -0.0035 -0.067 
Married 0.1212 1.928 0.2266 2.520 0.0541 0.587 
16-25 years -0.3484 -3.529 -0.1684 -1.301 -0.6344 -3.911 
26-35 years -0.1937 -3.037 -0.1312 -1.611 -0.3010 -2.875 
46-55 years -0.1003 -1.357 -0.0724 -0.820 -0.1745 -1.256 
56 or more -0.4324 -3.705 -0.5213 -3.695 -0.2896 -1.346 
Second. 0.7445 11.943 0.6833 9.223 0.9811 8.247 
Univ. 0.8810 13.622 0.7683 9.419 1.1282 9.883 
East -0.0154 -0.223 -0.0072 -0.083 -0.0130 -0.111 
Centre -0.1299 -1.420 -0.0939 . -0.839 -0.2348 -1.454 
Madrid -0.0694 -0.812 0.0008 0.008 -0.1960 -1.324 
North -0.0839 -1.100 -0.0521 -0.557 -0.1309 -0.981 
Unem1 -0.1306 -1.593 -0.2436 -2.120 -0.0183 -0.153 
Unem2 -0.2253 -1.777 -0.2757 -1.730 -0.2983 -1.371 
Unem3 -0.4778 -3.942 -0.5433 -3.525 -0.4816 -2.470 
Constant -1.5018 -15.309 -1.6303 -12.672 -1.5116 -9.592 
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Table 13. Training and employment in a recursive model (continued) 
Total Men Women 
Employed Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t 
Training93 0.2104 1.812 0.0060 0.033 0.2756 1.673 
Course93 -0.2133 -2.664 -0.0824 -0.713 -0.3574 -3.088 
Woman -0.2761 -6.011 
Married 0.1478 2.769 0.3847 5.209 -0.0669 -0.818 
16-25 years -0.3229 -4.259 -0.1861 -1.811 -0.4206 -3.594 
26-35 years -0.1613 -2.449 -0.0609 -0.694 -0.2341 -2.251 
46-55 years -0.0055 -0.069 -0.0113 -0.114 0.0106 0.077 
56 or more -0.6735 -8.135 -0.7640 -7.678 -0.4915 -3.167 
Second. 0.1261 2.107 0.1836 2.382 0.0645 0.667 
Univ. 0.5053 6.376 0.4137 3.744 0.6420 5.552 
East 0.1587 2.712 0.1378 1.811 0.2265 2.413 
Centre 0.1526 2.096 0.1256 1.394 0.1935 1.521 
Madrid 0.1291 1.555 0.0555 0.525 0.2771 2.021 
North 0.0706 1.068 0.1312 1.556 -0.0505 -0.459 
Empl00 1.5936 32.072 1.5046 24.067 1.7344 21.367 
Emp75 1.1162 7.887 1.2235 6.537 0.9719 4.220 
Emp50 0.9702 7.133 0.9584 5.136 0.9928 4.868 
Emp25 0.6404 4.947 0.6439 3.755 0.6096 3.050 
Constant -0.1555 -1.797 -0.2864 -2.561 -0.3772 -2.847 
Ro -0.1914 -2.ll9 -0.0040 -0.028 -0.2855 -2.434 
N.observ. 5970 3879 2091 
Adj. R2 0.5157 0.5214 0.5ll0 
Chi 2 7757.51 5001.46 2739.40 
% cases 9.05% 8.69% 9.71% 
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Appendix 
Means of the variables included in the training and employment equa-
tions 
Total Men Women 
Training93 0.0904 0.0868 0.0970 
Course93 0.0792 0.0618 0.1114 
Employed 0.8016 0.8288 0.7513 
Unemployed 0.1093 0.1010 0.1248 
Inactive 0.0889 0.0701 0.1238 
Woman 0.3502 
Married 0.6296 0.6790 0.5380 
16-25 years 0.1949 0.1789 0.2247 
26-35 years 0.3010 0.2866 0.3275 
36-45 years 0.2532 0.2510 0.2572 
46-55 years 0.1616 0.1807 0.1262 
56 years or more 0.0891 0.1026 0.0640 
Primary 0.6125 0.6501 0.5428 
Second. 0.2132 0.2126 0.2142 
Univ. 0.1733 0.1361 0.2424 
South 0.2293 0.2276 0.2324 
East 0.3157 0.3013 0.3424 
Centre 0.1321 0.1392 0.1190 
Madrid 0.1179 0.1167 0.1200 
North 0.2048 0.2150 0.1860 
39 
Means of the variables included in the training and mobility equa-
tions (continued) 
Total Men Women 
UnemO 0.6073 0.6377 0.5509 
Unem1 0.1728 0.1492 0.2166 
Unem2 0.0857 0.0830 0.0908 
Unem3 0.1340 0.1299 0.1415 
Emp100 0.7288 0.7476 0.6939 
Emp75 0.0197 0.0213 0.0167 
Emp50 0.0180 0.0159 0.0219 
Emp25 0.0182 0.0167 0.0210 
EmpO 0.2152 0.1984 0.2464 
N. observ. 5970 3879 2091 
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